FREE SPEECH, FAIRNESS, AND FIDUCIARY
DUTY IN BROADCASTING
LEE LOEVINGER.

The first amendment of the Constitution, as everyone should know, guarantees
free speech and a free press in the United States. By its literal terms the first amendment only prohibits Congress from making any law "abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press,"' but the Supreme Court has expanded this to apply to action
by any branch or agency of the federal government,2 as well as to the states, by
incorporation through the fourteenth amendment In effect the first amendment
has operated principally as a limitation on state action, as relatively few federal laws
have been attacked as infringing freedom of speech or the press The precedents
have been used on the basis of substantive similarity, without regard to whether the
government action is congressional, state, municipal, or administrative.'
By its ringing rhetoric, as much as by its actual holdings, the Supreme Court
has marked out a wide area within which expression is constitutionally protected
against any government interference. Over the years the Court has declared:
Those who won our independence had confidence in the power of free and
fearless reasoning and communication of ideas to discover and spread political and
economic truth. Noxious doctrines in those fields may be refuted and their evil
averted by the courageous exercise of the right of free discussion.'
For it is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not always
with perfect good taste on all public institutionsY
Freedom to distribute information to every citizen wherever he desires to
receive it is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free society that, putting aside
reasonable police and health regulations of time and manner of distribution, it must
be fully preserved. 8
* Member, Hogan & Hartson, Washington, D.C. Formerly Commissioner, Federal Communications
Commission; Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice;
Associate Justice, Minnesota Supreme Court.
' "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. CONST. amend. I, § i.

a Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946); see also Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146, x55-56 (x946).
aPalko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1937); Engel

v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (i96z); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Edwards v. South Carolina,
372 U.S. 229 (1963).

' One of the few cases holding a federal law invalid under the first amendment is Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965). Most of the precedents cited in the opinions of this case involve
state action.
' See note 4 supra.
'Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940).
'Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (i941).
8
Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (I943).
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[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dis-

pute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of
unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to
9
anger.
Men are entitled to speak as they please on matters vital to them; errors in
judgment and unsubstantiated opinions may be exposed, of course, but not through
punishment for contempt for the expression.' 0
Moreover, even where the utterance is false, the great principles of the Constitution which secure freedom of expression in this area preclude attaching adverse
consequences to any except the knowing or reckless falsehood."
For speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence
12
of self-government.
It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas
may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of
3
their hearers.'
Although the area of constitutionally protected expression is wide, it is not

unlimited. The Court has held that free speech is subject to exceptions "arising from
the necessities of the case."' 4 In 1897 the Court defined the exceptions by saying,
"freedom of speech and of the press (Art. i) does not permit the publication of libels,
blasphemous or indecent articles, or other publications injurious to public morals or
private reputation."'"

In 1942 the Court said:

There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous,
and the insulting or "fighting" words-those which by their very utterance inflict
6
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.'
While the Court has characterized the exceptions to first amendment protection

as "well recognized"' 7 and "well defined,"'" in fact they are neither. Obscenity is
not within the area of constitutionally protected expression because it is "utterly
without redeeming social importance."'" But this rationale gives little guidance in
defining what comes within that category. 0 It is highly doubtful that the "blas' Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S.
10

i, 4 (1949).
Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 389 (1962).

"Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964).
" Id. at 74.
1" Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (I969).
"4Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897).
1
" Id. This dictum has been often repeated. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Frohwerk
v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (x919); Gitlow v. United States, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Beard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (195I).
'0 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
'Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897).
'sChaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
'0 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957).
'0See the variety of views expressed in Memoirs v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968).
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21
phemous" or "profane" remain outside the scope of first amendment protection.

Although a group libel statute has been sustained as valid,22 the libel exception to
first amendment protection has been narrowed as the Court has held that even
23
libelous statements about public officials are protected unless actual malice is proved.

The government may constitutionally prohibit lotteries2 4 and speech presenting "a
clear and present danger" of substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.2
Over-all, the general rule clearly is that all kinds of verbal expression, as distinguished from action or threat of action, are protected against government suppression with increasingly narrow exceptions in the fields of obscenity, libel, and
incitement to breach of the peace.

BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The application of these principles to broadcasting is more complex than first
impressions suggest. There is no case squarely holding that broadcasting is within
the scope of the first amendment. However, in dicta the Court has said that the
principles of the first amendment apply to all media of expression, 2 and that "we
have no doubt that moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are included in the
press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment."2 " The reasoning by
which motion pictures are brought within the first amendment inescapably applies
also to broadcasting. The Court reasons that motion pictures are "asignificant medium for the communication of ideas" whose importance is not lessened by the fact
they are designed to entertain, because their production and exhibition is a large-scale
business conducted for private profit, or because they possess "greater capacity for
evil," particularly among youth, than other modes of expression.28 However, the
Court also says that the alleged capacity for evil "may be relevant in determining
the permissible scope of community control. 20
A. FCC License Renewal Denial
In any event, the Communications Act explicitly forbids the FCC to engage in
21

Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).

22 Beauharnais v. Illinois,
343 U.S. 250 (1952).

"3 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (r966); see also

Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Pub. Co., 362 F.2d i88 (8th Cir. 1966); Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 185
(1966).

"'In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 1IO (1892); cf.FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284 (95).
"2 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); ci. American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339
U.S. 382 (1950); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (951);

Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705

(1969).
"8 Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
"'United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948).
" Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (952); see also Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. New
York, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
9 Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952).
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censorship,3 0 and the Court has said that in this usage the term "connotes any
examination of thought or expression in order to prevent publication of 'objectionable'
material."'" This no-censorship provision has received surprisingly little discussion
or attention in FCC decisions. In two early cases under the federal Radio Act (which
contained a similar provision) 2 the Commission denied the renewal of broadcast
licenses mainly because of the broadcasting of objectionable programming 3 3 The
first case involved an apparent medical charlatan who operated his station as an
adjunct to the business of selling patent medicines to the public3 The second case
involved a minister who used the station licensed to a Trinity Methodist Church
exclusively to broadcast his own brand of vilification and extremism.35 He had been
convicted of contempt of court for defamation and used the broadcasting station as an
instrument of blackmail. On appeal from the Commission decision, it was held that
refusal to renew the license in these circumstances was not an interference with the
right of free speech, "but merely the application of the regulatory powers of Congress
in a field within the scope of its legislative authority." 36 The court of appeals said
the issue was simply whether there was "a reasonable exercise of governmental
control for the public good."3 7 As the court stated the facts, it was obvious that the
operation of the station did not serve the public good, so denial of its license renewal
was held proper.
Although there has been no subsequent case under the Communications Act
presenting precisely the same issues as the Trinity Methodist case, it seems likely that
both the Commission and the courts would reach a similar result on similar facts
today. However, there would probably be a somewhat more rigorous analysis of
the first amendment issue and an effort to fit the facts within an exception to the
first amendment or decide the case on other grounds. The distinction between the
Trinity Methodist case and Near v. Minnesota38 was not explored in the opinion
in the former, and has never been really analyzed by the courts.
In the Near case, state courts enjoined publication of a newspaper as a public
nuisance under a state statute. Virtually the entire content of the newspaper consisted of malicious, scandalous, and defamatory articles, many obviously false. The
injunction was issued after trial and was based on consideration of the newspaper's
over-all record of publication. The Supreme Court held that despite a legislative
Communications Act § 326, 47 U.S.C. §326 (1964).
"Farmers Educ. & Cooperative Union v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525, 529-30 (1959).
"Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 18, 44 Stat. 1170 (repealed 1934).
" KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. Federal Radio Commission, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 193); Trinity
'o

Methodist Church v. Federal Radio Commission, 62 F.2d 85o (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 284 U.S.
685 (1932).

" KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. Federal Radio Commission, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 193).
" Trinity Methodist Church v. Federal Radio Commission, 62 F.2d 85o (D.C. Cir. 5932), cert. denied,
284 U.S. 685 (932).
"Id. at 851.
"Id. at 852.
"INear v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (193).
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finding that a publication of this type was against the public interest, the statute
authorizing its suppression was unconstitutional. The Court said,
If such a statute, authorizing suppression and injunction on such a basis, is
constitutionally valid, it would be equally permissible for a legislature to provide
that at any time the publisher of any newspaper could be brought before a court,
or even an administrative officer (as the constitutional protection may not be
regarded as resting on mere procedural details) and required to produce proof
of the truth of his publication, . . . or stand enjoined. If this can be done, the
legislature may provide machinery for determining in the complete exercise of its
discretion what are justifiable ends and restrain publication accordingly. And it
would be but a step to a complete system of censorship.
For these reasons we hold the statute, so far as it authorized the proceedings
in this action ... to be an infringement of the liberty of the press guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment. We should add that this decision rests upon the
operation and effect of the statute, without regard to the question of the truth
of the charges contained in the particular periodical.39
i. The Public Interest Argument
The impact of the initial government action in both the Trinity Methodist case
and the Near case was exactly the same-to prevent further public speech by the
parties involved. In both cases the grounds for the action were the same-a finding
after full hearing that the over-all record of past expression by the parties involved
was scurrilous, defamatory, and contrary to the public interest. In neither case was
the party involved restrained as to his private speech; only the public means of
expression were involved-a radio station in one case, a newspaper in the other.
Whatever the logical distinction between the cases may be, it is neither self-evident
nor clearly stated in any opinion.4 °
The obvious difference between newspapers and broadcasting stations is that
the latter require a license to operate because the nature of broadcasting is such that
without some authoritative assignment of frequency, power, location, and other
technical parameters, mutually destructive interference results.4 ' However, the
necessity for control of the technical aspects of broadcasting does not logically imply
either the necessity or propriety of control of the content of broadcasting, much less
suggest the right to suppress particular types of expression which are within the
Slid. at 721, 722-23.
"The discussion of interstate commerce in the Trinity Methodist opinion is clearly irrelevant to the
constitutional issue. In the Near case, the suppression was by state action so jurisdiction existed without
interstate commerce. The interstate character of broadcasting transmissions is significant only as a basis
for federal action. However, it does not abrogate the mandate of the first amendment, for if that were
the case Congress would be free to censor virtually every publication in the United States on the same
grounds as it now legislates standards for their labor relations and wage policies. NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I (x937); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937); United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (194).

"National

Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
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scope of first amendment protection when published in print. The common argument offered to bridge this logical gap is one attributed to the NBC case: 42 since the
radio spectrum is so limited that only a few and not all who wish may broadcast,
it is necessary for government to choose those who are to be so licensed; in making
this choice the service offered, or to be offered, the public can and should be taken
into account; program service is the essence of the service offered to the public; and
therefore the government should grant or withhold licenses on the basis of a judgment
of the programming. The difficulty with this argument is that the chilling effect of
government suppression is precisely the same whether it is achieved by issuing a
prohibitory injunction or by denying the renewal of a license and forbidding
continued public expression without the license. It is precisely such suppression on
the basis of judgment as to social value that is forbidden by the first amendment.
2. The Scarcity Argument
The scarcity argument with respect to broadcasting facilities logically militates
as strongly against government suppression through the licensing power as in favor
of it. The theory and spirit of the first amendment, as repeatedly stated by the
Supreme Court, is that government action must not be exerted to suppress any
expression, no matter how hateful or noxious in the view of officials, except within
certain limited and defined categories. Where the opportunity for expression is unlimited, as in private speech or writing, government action to suppress some particularly objectionable expression may have a relatively limited effect on the general
discourse. But where the opportunity for expression is limited and requires a
government license, any action by government to suppress expression through the
licensed facilities or to favor or disfavor particular kinds of expression will necessarily have greater influence and impact on all expression over similarly licensed
facilities. Since the first amendment commands government neutrality with respect
to the content of all types of expression, government action to control the content
of expression on limited and licensed facilities is peculiarly inappropriate.

"National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. i9o (x943), is usually cited for the proposition that the FCC has the right to control programming on the basis of a statement in the opinion of
Justice Frankfurter that the FCC is not merely a traffic officer, policing electronic traffic, but has "the
burden of determining the composition of that traffic." This view is apparently accepted by Justice
White in the Red Lion case. However, in 1946, Professor Chafee wrote:
"Did Justice Frankfurter mean to say that the FCC could control the contents of programs,
contrary to what Justice Roberts had said a few years before [in F.C.C. v. Sanders Brothers, 309
U.S. 470, 474-75 (1940)]? Or did he merely have in mind the character of the persons
participating in broadcasting and their methods of competition? The latter seems to me more
probable and need cause no alarm."
Z. CHAFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT AND MAsS COMMUnICATIONS 580 (1947). My own investigation, including
discussions with persons then associated with the Court, the FCC, and the National Association of Broadcasters, convinces me that the view taken by Chafee is the correct one and was generally accepted at the
time of the decision.
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Unfortunately first amendment principles are usually tested in situations where
the natural sympathies of normal, decent people tend to be engaged by the noble
aims and decent purposes of the government officials seeking to exercise control and
to be repelled by the ignoble goals and unworthy purposes of those whose freedom is
at issue. There can be no reasonable contention that there is any real social value in
speech of the kind involved in the Near case, the Trinity Methodist case, or the
Terminiello case. But, as the Court has repeatedly pointed out, it is not the function
of government to make such judgments of social value, and the first amendment
commands legal toleration of ignoble as well as noble sentiments. It is difficult to
escape the feeling that government should not permit, by license or otherwise, such
public speech as was involved in the Tinity Methodist case. But it is even more
difficult to find a wholly logical distinction between government suppression in the
Trinity Methodist case and in the Near case.
B. Licensee Editoralization
In any event, under the Communications Act of 1934, government suppression of
speech has generally remained at a relatively low level of informal administrative
action with acquiescence by complaint licensees, and there has been no court decision
similar to the Trinity Methodist case.43 However, in 1941 in the Mayflower case
the Commission held that licensees could not express their own views in "editorials,"
but it reached this conclusion in the name of free speech.4 4 The Commission said,
Radio can serve as an instrument of democracy only when devoted to the
communication of information and the exchange of ideas fairly and objectively

presented. A truly free radio cannot be used to advocate the causes of the licensee.
It cannot be used to support the candidacies of his friends. It cannot be devoted
to the support of principles he happens to regard most favorably. In brief, the
broadcaster cannot be an advocate. 4 5
The issue, however, was not joined, since the applicant, to avoid hazard of its
license, submitted an affidavit undertaking full compliance with the Commission's
" The denial of license renewals under the Communications Act of 1934 was sustained in Immaculate Conception Church v. FCC, 320 F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 904 (x963),
and in Independent Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 193 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 595i), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837
(1952). Both cases involved denial of renewal applications after hearings in which it was proved that
applicants had misrepresented to the FCC with intent to deceive and committed other fraudulent
acts. In both cases applicants were disqualified for defect of character, and the action was sustained on
appeal. Although programming is mentioned in passing, there is no discussion of a free speech issue
in either case, and no ruling on such an issue. In Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 33 F.C.C. 250 (1962),
the Commission refused to renew a license because of misrepresentation to the Commission and obscene
programming. The court of appeals affirmed on the basis of the misrepresentation, carefully avoiding
consideration of the programming issue. Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. z964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 843 (1964); cf. KWK Radio, Inc., 34 F.C.C. 1039 (r963), 35 F.C.C. 561 (1963), where a
license was revoked because of the broadcasting of a fraudulent "treasure hunt."
" Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333 (194)5
4 1d. at 340.
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position, applicant's promises were accepted, and the license was renewed. This,
unfortunately, is the common course in administrative proceedings although appellate
courts often seem unaware of such reality.
In 1947 the Commission, on its own motion, undertook to review the prohibition
against broadcast editorializing, and after lengthy proceedings issued a report modifying, but not overruling, the Mayflower rule4 6 The report cited the Mayflower case
for the proposition that in the "presentation of news and comment the public interest
requires that the licensee must operate on a basis of overall fairness, making his
facilities available for the expression of the contrasting views of all responsible
elements in the community on the various issues which arise."' 7 Without expressly
overruling the Mayflower case, the report concluded that "overt licensee editorialization, within reasonable limits and subject to the general requirements of fairness
48
detailed above, is not contrary to the public interest.1

C. The Fairness Doctrine
The "reasonable limits" of licensee editorialization have never been defined, imposed, or challenged, but the "Fairness Doctrine" that broadcast facilities must be
made available for the expression of the contrasting views of all responsible elements
in the community has remained effective. In 1959 Congress amended the statutory
requirement that equal time be afforded qualified candidates for any political office
to create an exception for appearances on news programs, adding that this constituted no exception to the obligation of licensees "to afford reasonable opportunity
for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance."4 In June
1969, the Supreme Court held the Fairness Doctrine valid and constitutional.50
While the Fairness Doctrine concerns program content, it does not involve any
element of suppression, but rather requires the expression of all conflicting views
on issues of public importance. This distinction between suppressing certain types
of expression and requiring certain types of expression underlies two quite distinct
lines of authority in FCC development, although it has not often been explicitly
analyzed or considered.51
"'Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).

It should be noted that two

commissioners did not participate, one commissioner issued additional views, one commissioner issued
a separate opinion, and one commissioner dissented, so the report represented the views of only two,
or possibly three, of the seven commissioners. Nevertheless, the report has stood as the authoritative
statement of Commission policy in this area up to the present time.
Id.at 1250.
'0 Id. at 1253.
"Act of Sept. 14, 1959, § 1, 73 Stat. 557, amending 47 U.S.C. § 315(a).
" Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 376 (1969).
"1 The Supreme Court opinion in the Red Lion case glosses over this distinction and cites the
Trinity Methodist Church case as merely another precedent in the early development of the Fairness Doctrine.
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i. Control of Programming
From its beginning the FCC has required licensees to keep logs showing the
programs broadcast, classified by categories specified in FCC rules. It has generally
been understood that the Commission expected, and required, that licensees have
a minimum amount of programming in all categories." In 196o the Commission
issued a detailed, prolix statement on the subject, stating that it was not authorized
to "condition the grant, denial or revocation of a broadcast license upon its own
subjective determination of what is or is not a good program." 3 However, the
statement went on to say that since a broadcaster is required to program "in the
public interest ... , it follows despite the limitations of the First Amendment and
Section 326 of the Act, that his freedom to program is not absolute." The Commission said it was under a duty to review the programming of each licensee on a
continuing basis, and then specified fourteen program categories which it considered "usually necessary to meet the public interest." The statement offers no
explanation of the reasoning by which a statutory standard can imply a duty
"despite" the constitutional standards of the first amendment. The statement also
says that "the First Amendment forbids government interference asserted in aid of
free speech, as well as governmental action repressive of it." This suggests a confusion between the prohibition against establishment of religion and abridgment of
free speech. At best, the 196o statement on programming is so ambiguous and
confused as to first amendment principles that it cannot be said to be clearly
wrong. Nevertheless, it continues to be used and circulated by the Commission,
constituting part of the application and renewal forms in current use. 4
Despite Commission inquiry regarding and consideration of program categories,
the authority of the Commission to require specific categories of programming or
minima within categories has not yet been squarely presented and decided, either
by the Commission or the courts. There are three reasons for this. First, the
Commission and its staff have avoided direct confrontation on the issue. 5 Second,
applicants and licensees have been unable or unwilling to force the issue. " ' (In general, those who have been willing to force such an issue have lacked the resources,
and those who have had the resources have been unwilling to hazard them for such
"2See Loevinger, Religious Liberty and Broadcasting, 33 GEO. WASH. L. R~v. 631, 644 (1965).
" Report and Statement of Policy re Programming, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291 (xg6o).
" Amendment of Section IV (Statement of Program Service) of Broadcast Application Forms, x
F.C.C.2d 439 (1965), 5 F.C.C.2d 175 (1966). See especially concurring statements of Commissioner
Loevinger, x F.C.C.2d 447 and 5 F.C.C.2d 184.
"See Application of Lee Roy McCourry, 2 P & F RADio Rma. 2d 895 (x964). The dissenting opinion
of Commissioner Loevinger, concurred in by Commissioner Hyde, discusses the legal precedents and
concludes that the Commission does not have authority to require specific categories of programs. 2 P & F
RAnio REG. 2d 898. As to the issues and difficulties in setting categorical standards for programming, see
Loevinger, The Issues in Program Regulation, 2o FED. Com. B.J. 3 (1966).
"In Application of Lee Roy McCourry, supra note 55, the applicant abandoned his application, as
expected, following the Commission hearing order.
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a purpose.) Third, the majority of the Commission has become increasingly flexible
in this matter, and, despite the strident demands of a minority," has increasingly
relied upon a requirement that broadcasters survey the needs and desires of their
communities, rather than seeking to impose an official standard as to the type of programming required. s
2.

Effects of Recent Social Turbulence

The increasing political and social tensions and turbulence of recent years have
inevitably been reflected in broadcasting. The range of public demands upon broadcasting has become greater, with part of the public demanding more permissiveness to
accommodate unconventional and provocative programming, and another part of
the public demanding stricter adherence to established standards of propriety and
taste. Broadcasters have, uncertainly and somewhat hesitantly, broadened the range
of programming to include more controversial and provocative material. The
Commission has, somewhat timorously, moved toward the position that it cannot
forbid or suppress any program material, other than that falling into a class excepted
from first amendment protection, even by the usual indirection of refusing to renew
a license." Concomitantly the Commission has become more insistent upon and
expansive in applying the Fairness Doctrine. It has promulgated rules explicating
and adding procedural requirements to the Fairness Doctrine in cases involving
to
personal attacks and political editorials,6 ° and has applied the Fairness Doctrine
2
6
review.
judicial
on
upheld
been
now
have
actions
cigarette advertising. ' Both
The most significant of these developments is the promulgation of the personal
attack rules and the Supreme Court opinion sustaining their validity. The rules
provide,
When, during the presentation of views on a controversial issue of public importance, an attack is made upon the honesty, character, integrity or like personal
qualities of an identified person or group, the licensee shall, within a reasonable
time and in no event later than i week after the attack, transmit to the person
or group attacked (i) notification of the date, time and identification of the
"7See statement by Commissioners Kenneth A. Cox and Nicholas Johnson, Broadcasting in America
and the FCC's License Renewal Process: An Oklahoma Case Study, 14 F.C.C.2d i (x968).
" Ascertainment of Community Needs, 13 P & F 1Ario REaG. 2d 1903 (1968); City of Camden
(WCAM), 18 F.C.C.2d 412 (1969).
"' Pacifica Foundation, 36 F.C.C. 147 (1964); complaint of Anti-Defamation League, 6 F.C.C. 385
(1967), aff'd sub nom. Anti-Defamation League v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 930 (1969).
" Amendment of Part 73 of the Rules relating to procedures in the event of a personal attack, 8
F.C.C.2d 72, (1967), 9 F.C.C.2d 539 (1967), 12 F.C.C.2d 250 (1968), rev'd, 40o F.2d soo2 ( 7 th
Cir. 1968), rev'd sub nom. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 376 (x969). The rules appear
at 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123, 73.300, 73.598, 73.679 (1969), all of which sections are identical.
" WCBS-TV, Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine to Cigarette Advertising, 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967),
io P.C.C.2d 16 (I967), aff'd sub nom. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d xo82 (D.C. Cir. 1968), comments of
Solicitor General requested, 395 U.S. 973 (1969).
" See notes 6o and 61 supra.
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broadcast; (2) a script or tape (or an accurate summary if a script or tape is not
available) of the attack; and (3) an offer of a reasonable opportunity to respond
over the licensee's facilities.63
These provisions do not apply to foreign groups or figures, to attacks made by
political candidates or their spokesmen on other candidates, and to bona fide newscasts, news interviews, and on-the-spot coverage of news events, although the
general Fairness Doctrine may be applicable to some of these exceptions. 4
The editorializing provisions require a licensee who editorially endorses or opposes
a political candidate within twenty-four hours thereafter to notify other candidates,
or the candidate opposed, of the date and time of the editorial, provide a script or
tape of the editorial, and offer a reasonable opportunity for response. Where editorials are broadcast within seventy-two hours of the election, compliance must be
far enough in advance to enable those notified to prepare and present a timely
response.6 5
The validity of these rules was attacked by an association of radio and television
news directors, and the case was heard by the Supreme Court together with a case
arising before the promulgation of the rules and involving a ruling by the FCC
requiring a broadcasting station to provide free time for reply to a personal attack
under the general provisions of the Fairness Doctrine. 6 The Court held that the
Fairness Doctrine as developed and stated in the opinions of the Commission and the
personal attack and editorializing rules were within the statutory authority of the
Commission and that they "enhance rather than abridge the freedoms of speech
and press protected by the First Amendment."
The Court gave an expansive interpretation both to the power of the Commission
and the Fairness Doctrine itself. The Court says that the duty imposed by the
Fairness Doctrine is as follows:
The broadcaster must give adequate coverage to public issues, . .. and coverage
must be fair in that it accurately reflects the opposing views ....
This must be
done at the broadcaster's own expense if sponsorship is unavailable . . . . Moreover, the duty must be met by programming obtained at the licensee's own
67
initiative if available from no other source.
Under the rules, when a personal attack is involved, or a candidate is attacked or
endorsed in a political editorial, the person attacked or the candidates entitled to
reply must be offered reply time to use personally or through a spokesman. These
obligations differ from the general fairness requirements in that the broadcaster has
the option of choosing the method of presentation and spokesmen for expressing
as47 C.F.R. § 73.123(a) (1969).
8447 C.F.R. § 7 3 .12 3 (b)

(1969).
as47 C.F.R. § 73.123(c) (x969).
"6Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
7

" Id.at 377.
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positions that are not within the scope of the personal attack and political editorial-

izing rules.
The Court reasons that these requirements are well within the mandate to

protect the public interest, and that Congress has made it plain that the public
interest requires broadcasters to discuss both sides of controversial public issues.
The Court recognizes that "broadcasting is clearly a medium affected by a First
Amendment interest,... [but] differences in the characteristics of news media justify
differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them."6 Since only a tiny
fraction of those who seek to communicate by radio can do so, "it is idle to posit an
unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every
individual to speak, write, or publish."6 9 The core of the Court's reasoning is in
70

these passages :

No one has a First Amendment right to a license . . . . As far as the First
Amendment is concerned those who are licensed stand no better than those to
whom licenses are refused. A license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has
no constitutional right to be the one who holds the license or to monopolize a
radio frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens. There is nothing in the
First Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring a licensee to
share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary
with obligations to present those views and voices which are representative of his
community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.
*.. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters,
which is paramount.
.. . It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political,
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That
right may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC.
It does not violate the First Amendment to treat licensees given the
privilege of using scarce radio frequencies as proxies for the entire community,
obligated to give suitable time and attention to matters of great public concern.
To condition the granting or renewal of licenses on a willingness to present
representative community views on controversial issues is consistent with the ends
and purposes of those constitutional provisions forbidding the abridgement of
freedom of speech and freedom of the press.

Whether by happenstance or intent, these views were echoed and emphasized
within two weeks of their utterance in a decision by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. Writing for the court was Judge Warren Burger, who has
since become Chief Justice of the United States. In his last opinion as a circuit
judge, Judge Burger said,
08

1d. at 386.
'3'Id. at 388.

Id. at 389.90, 394.
I0
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The infinite potential of broadcasting to influence American life renders somewhat irrelevant the semantics of whether broadcasting is or is not to be described
as a public utility. By whatever name or classification, broadcasters are temporary
permittees-fiduciaries---of a great public resource and they must meet the highest
standards which are embraced in the public interest concept. The Fairness Doctrine
plays a very large role in assuring that the71public resource granted to licensees at
no cost will be used in the public interest.
Thus it now seems clearly established that the first amendment prevents the
Commission from suppressing the expression of any views that are not within one
72
of the judicially established exceptions to first amendment protection, and that
it permits the Commission to require adequate coverage of public issues accurately
reflecting opposing views.
D. The Licensee as a Fiduciary
But the reasoning of the cases goes beyond this. The Court now speaks of the
broadcast licensee as a "fiduciary" with obligations to the community and its public.
With respect to broadcasting, the rights under the first amendment are those of the
public to see and hear ideas and experiences, and these may not constitutionally be
abridged by either Congress or the Commission. Such reasoning raises an entirely
new issue going far beyond any that has heretofore been considered. What is the
mandate of the first amendment with respect to this constitutional right of the
public? The first amendment prohibits government action that suppresses speech
and permits government action to require speech representing opposing views, but
what government action is constitutionally commanded (if any)?
There is no clear and certain answer to this question, and probably the Supreme
Court itself has not yet considered it, although it seems to have elevated the Fairness
Doctrine to the height of a constitutional principle. At the very least, the Court
has read the Fairness Doctrine into the terms of the Communications Act, and, at the
most, it has incorporated it into the first amendment. In either case, it has deprived
the FCC of power either to repeal or basically amend the Fairness Doctrine. In
applying the first amendment to broadcasting, the Court has done it through the
Fairness Doctrine principle, which results in a fiduciary duty of broadcast licensees
with a corollary right in the public. The fiduciary duty can be defined, at least
"' Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, - F.2d -, z6 P & F RADIo REo. 2d
2095 (D.C. Cir., June 20, x969). Regardless of subsequent proceedings or disposition of this case, it

may be assumed that the passage quoted fairly represents Chief Justice Burger's views of this general
subject.
2
" United Federation of Teachers and WBAI-FM, 17 F.C.C.2d 204 (1969). It is noteworthy that
Commissioners Cox and Johnson concurred in this decision although the former dissented and the
latter abstained in Complaint of Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, 6 F.C.C.2d 385 (x967), which
involved virtually the identical issue. It is also noteworthy that the latter case was affirmed by the
court of appeals in an opinion written by Chief Justice (then Judge) Burger. Anti-Defamation League of
B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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in very general terms, as that of giving adequate coverage to public issues and

accurately reflecting opposing views. The corollary right is harder to specify. The
right of the public is to hear all views, not all individuals. Indeed, it is the very
impossibility of giving all individuals access to broadcasting facilities that is said to
give rise to the imposition of the fiduciary duty and its corollary right. Yet if there
is a legal right there must be some mode of enforcement.
i. How Would Fiduciary Duties be Enforced?
The superficially obvious answer to this question is that the FCC enforces the
fiduciary duty of broadcasters. But this proposition raises as many questions as it
answers. Is the FCC to be an active investigator, prosecutor, and advocate, as well
as adjudicator of broadcasting fairness? If so, we have probably established government censorship under the rubric of "fairness." Broadcasters are entirely dependent
upon the FCC for their economic existence. The power of licensing, revocation,
and renewal or denial of renewal is a discretionary power that is largely unreviewed
and ultimately unreviewable.7 Every broadcasting operation is subject to a host
of technical regulations and sooner or later is bound to violate some of them.
There may be differences of opinion as to the seriousness and the sanctions of almost

any violation, and the attitude of the Commissioners or their staff toward a
broadcaster cannot be assumed to be wholly devoid of possible influence toward such
issues. Consequently a prudent and responsible broadcaster is likely to be very
responsive to the views of FCC commissioners and staff, regardless of his own
judgment as to public needs or demands. Though not often articulated in this
context, the fact has become a stereotype of FCC thinking which is reflected in the
cliche of "regulation by the lifted eyebrow." This simply indicates recognition of
the fact that occasional martyrs or heroes will assert their independence regardless of
consequences to themselves; but, in general, people will bend to the will of those
who wield power over them, and the independence of individuals and enterprises
will be inversely proportional to the power government thus exerts.
Although these problems arise in a slightly different factual context with respect
to broadcasting, they are by no means new problems. In the 194os the same problems were considered by the Commission on the Freedom of the Press established
under the aegis of the University of Chicago. 4 The Commission considered, and
approved, the principle of the obligation of public service on the part of the press.
Referring to this, Professor Chafee, the distinguished reporter for the Commission,
first notes, "The ideal under consideration is for the press to give all sides of controversial public issues, or at least all sides which are supported by a substantial group
'For insight into some aspects of the problem, see Jaffe, WHDH: The FCC and Broadcasting License
Renewals, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1693 (1969).
"'See Z. CHAFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS (947).
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in the community with a modicum of reasonableness."7" Then, with respect to this
ideal, he wrote as follows:
My condusion about the public service theory is that for the most part it represents a moral and professional obligation of the press, not a legal obligation. 70
The demand that every newspaper shall always live up to the moral obligation
of complete fairness to both or all sides of controversial questions comes with ill
grace from preachers, professors, and writers who have brains enough to know how
hard it is to attain accuracy and impartiality in statements of fact-not to mention
expressions of opinion. It is a mistake to insist on the aseptic ideal of a very,
very perfect press. The most we can ask is that the men who operate the
instrumentalities of communication shall feel strongly the need of the community for even-handed presentation of all the relevant facts and do a really good
job in meeting that need-not a perfect job, for who of us can point to that in
77
his own works.
The press should not be responsible for its quality and points of view to the
government any more than to the advertiser or to the friends of the owner. The
true responsibility of the press is to the individuals who read and listen and in78
wardly digest.
Although the legal basis for government control of broadcasting is different than
for the printed press, the dangers of government influence and of enforced conformity to some official standards are no less, and probably greater. Even in
tyrannical dictatorship there is the possibility of a clandestine and "underground"
press. But with modern electronic instrumentation there is virtually no possibility
of an "underground" broadcasting service. So, whatever the legal foundation for
control may be, the dangers and evils of government censorship are no less in the
field of broadcasting than in the area of the print media.
2. Fiduciary Duty Circumscribes FCC Action

Thus with the declaration by the Supreme Court that in the field of broadcasting
the constitutional right of free speech belongs to the public and that this is matched
by a fiduciary duty on the part of broadcasters to present opposing views, the mediating principle between the right and the duty becomes that of fairness, and a
necessity arises for application of this principle in cases of conflict by a tribunal
with judicial objectivity and neutrality. Whatever may be the case in other areas
of administrative law and broadcasting, in the sensitive area of reporting news and
75

Id. at 628.
• Id. at 643.
"'d. at 648-49.
" Id. at 677. Professor Chafee takes the position that broadcasting is in a different legal position than
other mass media because of the necessity of government licensing. Id. at 634-43. However, it seems
highly dubious that supervision of the accuracy or authenticity of the news is warranted by the authority
to license, or permissible under the first amendment, even though it is undertaken with fervent
avowals of noncensorship and strict adherence to first amendment principles, as in Democratic National
Convention Television Coverage, 16 F.C.C.2d 650 (z969).
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presenting opposing views on public issues, neither the FCC nor any other agency
can be complainant, prosecutor, and impartial adjudicator--or hope to be accepted
in such different roles. Under the Fairness Doctrine as now construed by the Court,
the rights are those of the public, so it is reasonable to infer that enforcement of
those rights will be by community initiative and complaint under established principles of general applicability. Government initiative and complaint would necessarily result from and represent the views of government officials that the content
of some speech or expression had not been fair. This is hardly compatible with
neutrality and objectivity in such a sensitive area. Impartiality and detachment are
much more easily maintained when passing on the complaints of others than when
acting as an enforcement agent. The role of zealous critic and reformer of broadcasting, pursued in extra-official activities as author and lecturer, which seems so
attractive to some commissioners, is incompatible with the duty of determining
the balance of fairness and the bounds of fiduciary duty which has now been thrust
upon the Commission by the Court. Thus a corollary to the first amendment rights
of the public and fiduciary duty of the broadcaster is the impartiality of the Commission as a mediating adjudicator.
This has implications beyond the duty of personal restraint and a judicial attitude
on the part of commissioners. It means also that the Commission, like the courts
in first amendment cases, must be prepared to accept unpopular, and even hateful
or despicable, expression as entitled to constitutional protection and the right to
utterance. If the constitutional principles previously declared by the Supreme Court
are to be maintained, the Commission cannot, as it has done in the past, declare
that "atheists or persons with similar views" are not entitled to radio time,"° or
write a long homily on the virtues of permitting all views regarding religious subjects which concludes by summarily denying the opportunity for atheists or freethinkers to present their views.8 0 The Commission has, at least in recent years, been
reasonably tolerant in permitting unpopular, unfashionable, and uncongenial views
to be expressed on broadcasting facilities. If the Supreme Court really means what
it says in the Red Lion case, that first amendment rights to expression by broadcasting
belong to the public, then the Commission has the onerous duty of requiring that
even the most objectionable and unpopular views are given broadcast expression
when the demand is made, provided only that they do not fall within one of the
judicially recognized exceptions to the first amendment.
Another potential implication of the fiduciary duty of broadcasters to act as
proxies for the public in presenting all views is that presentations pursuant to such
"' Letter from Chairman Wayne Coy to Edward J. Heffron, President, Religious Radio Association,
Aug. i8, 1948, 3 P & F RADIo REo. 264 (1948).
"oRobert H. Scott, 5 P & F RADIo REG. 859 (1949), 25 P & F RADIO REG. 349 (1963). See also
Letter to Madalyn Murray, June ii, 1965, F.C.C. 65-476 (not published); and Loevinger, Religious
Liberty and Broadcasting,supra note

52.
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duty may be privileged against legal sanctions for libel.8 ' Certainly this is the logical
implication of language in the opinions suggesting that the licensee has no more
right of censorship than the FCC. By the same token, this approach involves revision
of the traditional FCC concept of licensee responsibility. With respect to public
issues, the primary responsibility of the licensee is not to approve or disapprove
the content of material broadcast but to provide facilities for the broadcasting of views
that are fairly representative of the range of opinion within the community. If this
involves broadcasting views that are upsetting, and even shocking, to many, as it
almost surely will in contemporary society, that consequence is the inescapable result
of the first amendment mandate as construed by the Court and applied to the
limited and licensed broadcasting facilities available in present technological and
social circumstances.
3. Scarcity Argument and the FiduciaryTheory
As has been noted above, the scarcity argument, which is an important part of
the Court's reasoning in the Red Lion case, is at best an equivocal support for the
suppression of broadcast speech, and more logically argues against such an exertion
of government power. On the other hand, the scarcity argument does rationally
support an approach that undertakes to insure the opportunity for expression of all
views, without the suppression or denial of any. Thus it is a logical underpinning
for the fiduciary duty theory of broadcasting. If technology and the natural order
limit the possibility of broadcasting facilities so that they are not available to all
who seek them, it is neither unfair nor a limitation of any individual's right to free
speech to require that the one chosen by government to receive the right to operate
shall have a duty to provide opportunity for the expression of all views on such
facilities. Of course, such a duty imposes some burden. But the burden is a relatively
small one, and presumably is compensated by the privilege of operating on the
assigned frequency for profit.
It does not follow that scarcity of broadcasting facilities justifies general government supervision of all broadcasting content or the establishment of programming
standards. In fact, the assertion of general government control of programming,
either through the imposition of pervasive standards or by means of over-all supervision, is substantially equivalent to suppression of disapproved program content, since,
in effect, only officially approved program content is permitted and all other expression is suppressed. The imposition of a requirement for carrying certain limited
categories of speech of social importance, under the Fairness Doctrine, does not have
"' Such a result is supported, if not compelled, by Farmers Educ. & Cooperative Union v. WDAY,
36o U.S. 525 (959); and N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (x964); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64 (1964); Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383
U.S. 75 (r966); Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Pub. Co., 362 F.2d x88 (8th Cir. 1966); Washington Post
Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1o1 (1967).
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the same consequences, and so must be judged on a different basis. The Court
has, at least by implication, recognized this distinction. In the Red Lion opinion
it carefully notes that
When the Congress ratified the FCC's implication of a fairness doctrine in
1959 it did not, of course, approve every past decision or pronouncement by the
the future.8 2

Commission on this subject, or give it a completely free hand for
We need not approve every aspect of the fairness doctrine to decide these
cases....
* . . We need not and do not now ratify every past and future decision by the
83
FCC with regard to programming.

An argument that the Red Lion decision has, by implication or otherwise, given the
FCC general supervisory control of broadcast programming is not only unwarranted
by the explicit language of the decision but is inconsistent with an analysis of the
underlying rationale.
On the other hand, the scarcity argument does have implications beyond the
scope of the decided cases. If the scarcity of broadcasting facilities warrants the
imposition of a fiduciary duty under the first amendment on those privileged to
operate such facilities, does the same reasoning require the same result in similar circumstances involving other media? Logically, the answer has to be that in similar
circumstances the same legal consequences will follow. This raises the question
whether newspaper facilities are not even more limited than broadcasting facilities.
It is easily demonstrated that newspaper facilities are numerically more limited than
broadcasting facilities. There are more than 6,50o radio stations (AM and FM)
and over iooo television stations and the number is constantly increasing."4 In contrast, there are only about 1,75o daily newspapers published in the United States. 5
Broadcasting stations are located in hundreds more cities than have daily newsapers,
and all large cities have competitive broadcasting stations, although less than fifty
86
cities have competitive daily newspapers.
The arguments usually made to distinguish broadcasting scarcity from newspaper
scarcity are that broadcasting is limited by the electromagnetic spectrum, whereas
the number of newspapers is not limited by any natural phenomenon, and that
broadcasting facilities are licensed by the government while newspapers are not.
These arguments are based on differences between the media but not on differences
that are necessarily significant with respect to the first amendment and the right of the
public to free expression. So far as the opportunity for the utterance of all views is
8 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 376, 385 (1969).
85

1d. at 396.
"' See 34 FCC

ANN. REP. 113

(1968).

Current statistics on licensed broadcasting stations are pub-

lished weekly in the periodical Broadcasting.
" See RmytoND NiXON, TRENDs IN NEWSPAPER OWNERstp (1968). See also Brief for the American
Newspaper Publishers Ass'n as amicus curiae, Citizens Pub. Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (x969).
80
1d.
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concerned, it does not make any difference whether facilities are limited by natura
forces or economic forces8 In either case they are quite beyond the control of the
ordinary citizen; and in either case the limitation on the expression of views is the
same. Indeed, the effectiveness of economic limitations is the whole foundation of
our antitrust policy, which makes no sense otherwise. In antitrust cases in the
newspaper field, the Court has clearly recognized these assumptions8 8 Furthermore,
at the present time the limitation of electronic communication facilities is in part
the result of a deliberate choice by government agencies, including the FCC, which
have chosen to permit fewer facilities than technology would allow for various
economic and social reasons.
The fact that broadcasting facilities are licensed is simply a lawyer's jurisdictional
argument, which logically has little to do with control of broadcast speech. The
assignment of frequency, power, and other technical broadcasting specifications has
no more to do with the content of what is uttered over broadcasting facilities than
the government power to prohibit very loud noises has to do with the right to
utter any views or sentiments quietly. Most newspapers move in interstate commerce, enjoy second-class mailing privileges, and hold various other governmentgranted rights which might serve as a jurisdictional basis for asserting control if the
legislative and judicial branches should ever concur in seeking to do so.
It is not asserted here that newspapers should be subject to government control
or to an officially imposed Fairness Doctrine. However, it is asserted that broadcasting and publishing have much in common, are more similar than dissimilar,
and are likely to be treated similarly by government with respect to rights and
duties. It is not a remote possibility that newspapers may be distributed electronically,
either by the same means now employed in broadcasting, or by transmission techniques employed by broadcasting in the future. Technological developments are
certain to make the distinction between electronic and print journalism less and less
important. The legal status of broadcasting today is likely to be that of publishing
tomorrow.
These suggestions are neither new nor without respectable advocacy. In 1946
the Commission on Freedom of the Press, with eminent membership and sponsorship, concluded, among other things,
We recommend that the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of the press
be recognized as including the radio and motion pictures.
"' Amicus curiae in the Citizens Pub. Co. case made a powerful showing that the number
papers that could be published was subject to inescapable economic limitations manifested in
trend throughout the United States. In deciding the case the Supreme Court did not even deign
the argument. Brief for the American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n as amicus curiae, Citizens
v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
" Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. i (945); Citizens Pub. Co. v. United States,
131 (1969).
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We recommend that the agencies of mass communication accept the responsi-

bilities of common carriers of information and discussion.

9

In essence both of these recommendations have been adopted by the Supreme Court
for broadcasting. But the Court has gone further. It has converted the responsibilities
of broadcasting, with respect to information, into legal duties, and it has elevated
these duties to constitutional status. There can be little doubt that these principles
will be the law for a long time to come.90 The chances are great that the technology of broadcasting will change before these governing legal principles change.
CONCLUSION

Law, as Justice Holmes pointed out long ago, is more the result of felt social
needs than of abstract logic. The Supreme Court sits as a kind of continuing constitutional convention, adapting the broad general provisions of the Constitution to
the changing needs of contemporary society. On occasion, the Court, by way of
implication or construction, writes a few additional provisions into the Constitution.
There may be differing views as to the process or the reasoning by which the result
was achieved, but the legal status of broadcasting with respect to the first amendment seems to be dearly established now.
A broadcast licensee has the same, but no greater, right to express his views
over the licensed broadcast facilities as any other member of the public. The duty of
the licensee is to give adequate coverage to public issues that is fair in that it
accurately reflects opposing viewpoints. The right of free speech by broadcasting
belongs to the public, not to the licensee, and the licensee is a proxy for the public
with a fiduciary duty to insure the fair presentation of all viewpoints. It is all
viewpoints that are entitled to be heard, not all individuals or all spokesmen, except
in the cases, specified by statute or rule, involving political candidates or personal
attacks. The FCC may specify procedures and applications of this fiduciary duty,
but it may not constitutionally abridge the right of the public to receive the full
range of views and information which the licensee's initiative discovers or responsible elements of the community demand or offer. These principles leave many
questions unanswered and will no doubt create many practical problems in operadon. That is usually the case with constitutional principles. These represent the
Supreme Court's articulation of the needs of contemporary society and its construction of the first amendment in application to a technology of communication
that could not have been dreamed of by those who first wrote the great principle
of free speech into the Constitution. The first amendment has been rewritten for
"oZ. CHAFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNIcATION 801-02 (1947).
00 It should be noted that seven justices concurred in the Red Lion decision, one did not participate

because he had not heard the oral argument, and there was one vacancy. The opinion was written by
justice White, who is one of the younger members of the Court. Chief justice Burger, who has taken
office since the decision was rendered, has clearly stated similar views.
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the twentieth century. It is not certain that this latest revision will insure a free
marketplace of ideas, prevent government censorship, and help maintain a democratic social and economic order. It never was certain that the principles of the
first amendment would be successful. The ideal remains the same. The challenge
now is to say what the ideal of free speech means and how it may be achieved in
the confused, groping society of today's turbulent technological world.

